The tension in the great powers will set the global geopolitical rhythm and will condition the prospects for recovery. The US-China relationship has been consolidated as the structuring rivalry of the international system. Added to this is the risk of escalation in Ukraine, with the deployment, by the end of 2021, of more than 100,000 Russian troops to the border, and the US assertion that an aggression would not go unanswered. Along with these two great rivalries, tensions are resurfacing between states such as Algeria-Morocco, China-India or, to a lesser extent, Egypt-Ethiopia.
2021 ended with heightened concern about the global effects of heightened tension over Taiwan, especially Chinese incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone and Xi Jinping warning that the US was playing with fire. This has revived the intense discussion about the sustainability of the current status quo, and about the inevitability of a confrontation between the two superpowers. Taiwan is not the only sticking point. In 2022, we will have to be aware of how this rivalry resonates in other competition scenarios such as the South China Sea, the Korean peninsula, the opening of arctic routes or trade wars.
For its part, China continues to display its ambition in Africa, to whom it promises a partnership between equals, and broadens the horizons of its global influence in Latin America, for whom it is already its main trading partner. In addition to infrastructure investments and debt purchases, in 2021 China added vaccine diplomacy to its foreign policy toolbox. By 2022, China has promised to donate 2 billion vaccines to the world. But what seems to worry the United States and other allied countries are advances in quantum computing, as indicated by the fact that Washington has placed a dozen Chinese companies on an export blacklist. In addition, China’s military assertiveness is increasing and is reflected in defense spending -with a 6.8% increase compared to 2020-, and in the news about tests with hypersonic weapons.
The transatlantic link will also be under the spotlight, especially during the NATO summit in Madrid on June 29 and 30, 2022. This meeting will be a thermometer to test the level of convergence and trust between the United States and its European allies, and to check how the Alliance is positioned in relation to China. Vladimir Putin’s actions on the eastern flank of the alliance will also condition the summit’s agenda. Thematically, one of NATO’s priorities will be cybersecurity.
The Alliance will try to recover positions in the innovation race, especially in everything that has to do with emerging and disruptive technologies, and will advance in the implementation of the North Atlantic Defense Innovation Accelerator (DIANA). Changes in the organization’s leadership are also expected. Jens Stoltenberg ends his mandate in September and is committed to the appointment, for the first time, of a woman for the General Secretary.
In this context, one of the fashionable concepts in the European Union is that of strategic autonomy. This idea connects with the vision proclaimed by the leaders of the community institutions and certain member states such as Emmanuel Macron of a more geopolitical Europe.
From 2022 it should be declined in concrete actions. During the first half of 2022, with France assuming the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, the Strategic Compass (better known by its name in English, Strategic Compass) will be adopted, a document that will identify challenges and threats, articulate capacities and try to project Europe’s influence as a regional and global actor more strongly and coherently. Finally, this year the adoption of the so-called NIS2 directive should also be accelerated with the aim of protecting networks and communication systems against
cyber-attacks.
To what extent will the EU want to project itself towards the Indo-Pacific or will it continue to focus on the closest spaces? If it follows the pace set by the two superpowers, it will look to the Indo-Pacific and cooperation with the United States and competition with China will gain weight on the security agenda. However, the balance can quickly tip the other way. A common element of the destabilization in the two neighborhoods (eastern and southern) of the Union is the impact on
the energy and migration agenda, with the use of pressure measures or even blackmail in the matter of gas pipelines and refugees.
Although in smaller numbers, there are also opportunities for detente on a global scale. The most significant has to do with Iran. A novelty at the regional level are the gestures of appeasement between the Saudis and Iranians, as seen, for example, in the United Nations General Assembly.
Representatives of regional powers in the Middle East were able to meet in Baghdad in August 2021 and Saudi Arabia is considering reopening the Iranian consulate in the city of Jeddah. In a year of high geopolitical tension and with upward pressure on energy prices, the consolidation or not of this phase of relaxation around the Strait of Hormuz is decisive.
